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NOTE: This article highlights some of the 
research findings that will be published in the 
authors 'new book, State Enterprise Zones: Do 
They Work? The book, which the Upjohn 
Institute is publishing, will be available soon. 
Check our Web site (www.upjohninstitute.org) 
for details.
although originally conceived as a 
federal program for helping distressed 
inner-city areas, enterprise zones have 
become a central pillar of many states' 
economic development efforts. In most 
states, zones have been used to focus 
economic development policy on poorer 
areas. The justifications for such 
targeting range from the arguments of 
spatial mismatch theorists, who claim that 
inner-city minorities have particular 
difficulty accessing the buoyant job 
markets of the suburbs, to Timothy 
Bartik's work showing that the efficiency 
of economic development policy is likely 
to be improved by focusing benefits on 
the disadvantaged.
State and local enterprise zone 
programs consist mainly of tax 
instruments: property tax abatements, 
sales tax exemptions, and income tax 
deductions, credits, and exemptions for 
employment creation, capital investment, 
or income creation in the zones. In this 
article we provide brief answers to the 
following questions: 1) Are these zone tax
incentives big enough to induce firms to 
locate into zones? 2) Do zone incentives 
induce new job growth and, if they do, 
who gets these jobs? 3) How costly are 
these incentives?
Are Enterprise Zone Incentives 
Large Enough?
To answer this question we employ a 
computer micro-simulation model, 
TAIMez, to measure how the actual 
incentives available in each of the 
enterprise zones in our study would 
improve a firm's rate of return on an 
investment in a new manufacturing 
facility in that zone. TAIMez is a 
hypothetical firm model that includes 
computer algorithms for the calculation of 
state and local corporate taxes and 
incentives in our sample of 75 enterprise 
zones in 13 states from 1990 to 1998. 
The "firms" in the model are actually a set 
of financial statements constructed to be 
representative of actual firms in each of 
16 manufacturing sectors. (The workings 
of the model are described in Peters and 
Fisher, forthcoming). The result is an 
estimate, year by year for 20 years, of the 
increase in after-tax cash flow attributable 
to the firm's investment in a particular 
city and enterprise zone, with and without 
"generally available tax incentives" 
(available both in and out of enterprise 
zones), and with and without zone 
incentives.
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In the average zone among our 75, the 
total tax incentive package available (both 
general and enterprise zone incentives) 
lowered the effective tax rate on a new 
plant by about a third. In 13 zones, the 
incentive package cut the tax rate by more 
than half. (The effective tax rate is the 
state and local tax liability as a percent of 
the pretax cash flow from the new plant.) 
The average tax rate before incentives 
among the cities ranged from 5.2 percent 
to 22.8 percent, while the average rate 
after incentives ranged from 1.4 percent 
to 11.7 percent.
The extra inducement a firm
receives from enterprise zone
incentives is quite small
when put in terms of the
wage equivalent.
In the policy context, it is often useful 
to judge the size of incentives by the 
dollar value to the firm per new plant job. 
Our measure is the value of the incentives 
to the firm discounted over 20 years at 10 
percent. In other words, it is the lump 
sum tax-free grant that would be 
equivalent in value to the incentives,for a 
firm with a 20-year planning horizon. In 
the average zone, the total incentive 
package was worth about $5,000 per job, 
but it reached a value of $10,000 per job 
or more in five zones and was less than 
$2,000 per job in eight zones.
Tax incentives are usually thought to 
have their largest effects on the 
intrametropolitan location decision, 
where other spatially variable factors, 
such as labor and transportation costs, are 
about equal. Within a metro area, at least 
within a given state, the nonzone 
incentives will also be equal. Only the 
additional differential provided by a zone 
location will affect the intrametropolitan 
location decision. How large is this 
differential?
In 3 of our 13 states (Florida, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin), there are no general 
incentives. At the other extreme are 5 
states (California, Connecticut, Kentucky, 
Missouri, and New York) that provide the 
least relative advantage to zones; here the 
zone incentives make up less than 40
percent of the total incentive package. In 
the remaining 5 states, there are both 
general and zone incentives, but the zone 
incentives make up 69 percent to 81 
percent of the package.
Another way of getting at the question 
of the importance of zone incentives is to 
consider the size of the wage premium that 
an incentive package would just offset. 
Wages are a much larger component of 
costs than are taxes (about 14 times as 
large, on average), and wage rates can vary 
substantially from one place to another. 
Again using TAIMez, we calculated the 
hourly wage differential at a new plant 
location that would provide the firm with 
the same present value of cost savings over 
20 years as the enterprise zone incentives 
available there. Indiana provided the most 
valuable zone differential at 6.8 percent of 
wages. But the zone incentives were 
equivalent (on average across sectors and 
cities) to a wage reduction of just 0.7 
percent to 2.5 percent in 11 ofthe 13 states. 
A small wage premium (2.5 percent or 
less) would be sufficient, in most 
locations, to wipe out the advantages 
created by zone incentives.
Do Zone Incentives Result in 
New Jobs?
The last section suggests that most 
enterprise zone incentives are too small to 
materially affect the investment and 
location behavior of most firms. Do 
empirical studies provide any reason to 
doubt this deduction? Studies of 
enterprise zones fall into a much broader 
literature looking at the effects of taxes on 
growth. This literature has been surveyed 
a number of times (see Bartik 1991 and 
Wasylenko 1997); suffice it to say that 
there is some agreement that state and 
local taxes in general have a measurable, 
but modest, impact on growth. However, 
the econometric literature on the effects 
of enterprise zones incentives in 
particular is small. While a few early 
studies did find enterprise zones to be 
effective, most ofthe evidence suggests 
that zones have almost no influence on 
local growth (see Wilder and Rubin 1996, 
Fisher and Peters 1997, and Peters and 
Fisher, forthcoming).
Why do enterprise zones perform so 
poorly? First, the extra inducement a firm
receives from enterprise zone incentives 
is quite small when put in terms ofthe 
wage equivalent. Second, enterprise 
zones are typically in areas with poor
It turns out that the jobs 
in zones are often taken
by nondisadvantaged
individuals living far from
the targeted areas.
infrastructure, poor connections to the 
transportation system, high crime, and so 
on. As Dabney (1991) has argued, 
enterprise zone incentives would have to 
be very large indeed to make up for these 
obstacles to investment.
Who gets the (very) few jobs actually 
created by zone incentives? For zones to 
be judged successful, a substantial share 
ofthe jobs that are created must be filled 
by inhabitants of enterprise zones or 
surrounding poor neighborhoods. It turns 
out that the jobs in zones are often taken 
by nondisadvantaged individuals living 
far from the targeted areas. Many states 
attempt to counter this problem by 
restricting incentives to jobs filled by 
certain kinds of persons. Ofthe 13 states 
we looked at, 11 offered some sort of jobs 
credit program, and all 11 targeted those 
credits either to zone residents or to 
population groups that were economically 
disadvantaged. The targeting of jobs 
credits is effective, however, only if firms 
are able and willing to use them. The cost 
of complying with jobs credit targeting 
requirements appears to be much higher 
than the cost of claiming, say, an 
investment tax credit on an income tax 
return. This may be why the Ohio jobs 
credit, while fairly generous ($3,000 per 
job), is used by fewer than 10 percent of 
firms locating in enterprise zones.
A larger problem is that capital 
incentives tend to dominate labor 
incentives; thus, the jobs credit may be 
viewed as irrelevant. A fairly average job 
credit ($2,000) fully utilized in its first two 
years reduces wage costs of a job paying 
$ 12.00 per hour by a mere 48 cents. How 
many targeted individuals become 
attractive hires at a wage of $ 11.50 for the 
first two years who would not have been
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hired at the standard wage of $ 12.00? It is 
easy to imagine that targeted employees 
have perceived productivity differentials 
valued at far more than 48 cents an hour by 
most zone employers.
How Costly are Enterprise Zone 
Incentives?
Do state and local governments gain or 
lose revenues as a result of enterprise 
zones? In our study we found that, on 
average, state and local governments 
would gain about $ 18,000 in revenue over 
a 20-year period for each job that was 
induced to locate in the state because of 
the zone incentive package. On the other 
hand, governments would lose about 
$6,600 for every job that received 
incentives unnecessarily (the plant would 
have been built in the state anyway).
An induction rate can be calculated 
from empirical work on the inter-state 
elasticity of economic activity with 
respect to taxes, which appears to be in 
the range of-0.1 to -0.6. If we take -0.3 
as the elasticity, this implies that the 
typical incentive package (which 
represents about a 26 percent reduction in 
taxes for the firm) in our sample cities 
would produce less than a 10 percent 
increase in the flow of new jobs into the 
state. This, in turn, means that there are 
far more jobs draining revenues from the 
state and locality at the rate of $6,600 per 
job than there are jobs providing the net 
gain in taxes of $ 18,000 per job. The net 
effect in our 75-zone sample was a total 
state-local revenue loss of about $59,000 
for every new job induced by incentives.
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Mini-Grant Funded Research
J_ he Upjohn Institute provides small 
levels of funding, titled mini-grants, 
intended to facilitate the research and 
publications of less experienced faculty. 
We will occasionally use Employment 
Research to feature work that has been 
supported partially with an Upjohn 
Institute mini-grant.
Influencing Attitudes in the Workplace
Robert J. Oxoby, University of Calgary
Economic analyses of workplace 
behavior typically focus on how 
employees behave given their labor- 
leisure preferences and the incentives 
(i.e., wages) they face. Central to this 
research is the idea that these items can be 
separated; that is, no causal relation exists 
between preferences and wages. 
However, research in organizational 
psychology and industrial sociology has 
emphasized that incentives may feedback 
on preferences, affecting employees' 
attitudes and therefore their behaviors in 
the workplace. For example, it has been 
argued that individual attitudes and 
preferences are malleable and change in 
order to reduce cognitive dissonance. 
Thus, an individual who is paid poorly 
may alter her attitudes regarding
employment, focusing on the challenges 
in her job rather than the low pay she is 
earning. (One of the first tests of the 
theory of cognitive dissonance involved 
paying people different sums to perform 
an onerous task. In accord with the 
theory, individuals who were paid the 
least reported enjoying the task the most.)
Along this line of logic, one might 
expect characteristics of the workplace to 
alter the ways individuals perceive 
employment, their role in the firm, and 
hence their behavior in the workplace. 
This study sought to identify how 
reported attitudes regarding aspects of 
one's compensation package are 
influenced by characteristics of the 
workplace. To explore these issues, we 
analyzed the 1997 Work Orientations 
Survey by the International Social Survey 
Program. The survey questioned 
individuals about their attitudes regarding 
the importance of various characteristics 
of their workplace, such as wages, time 
on the job, and job security.
Our results paint a picture of the 
employee that falls more in line with what 
is predicted by psychology than 
economics. For example, we find that 
individuals of high income are more 
likely to rank "high income" as important 
and "job security" as unimportant in 
determining job satisfaction. Further, 
more highly paid individuals report that 
education and length of service with the 
firm should be relatively unimportant in 
determining an individual's wages. Our 
results seem to support the contention that 
attitudes are chosen to maximize utility: 
better paid individuals point to the 
importance of talent in determining 
wages, thereby raising their self-image 
and avoiding dissonance that may be 
associated with other areas in which they 
are less successful.
Rather than preferences being 
immutable, our results indicate that 
compensation and one's position in the 
firm can influence preferences and 
workplace behavior. The lesson here is 
that we should pay attention not only to 
the ways in which incentives affect 
behavior, but also to the ways in which 
incentives affect perceptions and 
attitudes, which may feedback on 
behavior.
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Kevin M. Hollenbeck
Washington's Workforce 
Development System 
Pays Off
Waashington State's legislature 
has revealed its understanding of the 
importance of data-driven program 
performance monitoring and 
accountability to the public. In the arena 
of workforce development, it has 
mandated the state's Workforce Training 
and Education Coordinating Board 
(WTECB) to provide the public with a 
full and open accounting of the efficacy 
of the programs that they monitor. The 
WTECB provides the public with biennial 
evaluations of the extent to which 
participants in the state workforce 
development system 1) achieve 
workplace competencies, 2) find 
employment, 3) achieve family-wage 
levels of earned income, 4) are 
productive, 5) move out of poverty, and 
6) are satisfied with program services and 
outcomes. The performance data for 
these outcomes come from administrative 
data or surveys of program participants 
(or employers of participants).
The WTECB has also a seventh 
evaluative outcome return on 
investment that is most appropriately 
calculated by using data from 
nonparticipants as well as participants. 
The data burden is greatly expanded as 
compared to what is required for the other 
six criteria, and so the reporting is 
quadrennial. This article presents a 
summary of the state's most recent study 
of the net impacts and costs and benefits 
of its workforce training programs. The 
study was undertaken by Upjohn Institute 
staff.
Specifically, the study involved net 
impact and benefit-cost analyses of nine
programs. Five of the programs serve 
job-ready adults: Community and 
Technical College Job Training, Private 
Career Schools, Apprenticeships, Job 
Training and Partnership Act1 (JTPA) 
Title III programs, and Community and 
Technical College Worker Retraining. 
Two of the programs serve adults with 
employment barriers: Community and 
Technical College Adult Basic Skills 
Education and JTPA Title II-A programs. 
The other two programs serve youth: 
JTPA Title II-C programs and Secondary 
Career Technical Education.
Non-Experimental Approach with 
Administrative Data
Methodologically, the best way to 
determine the net impact of a program is 
to conduct a random assignment 
experiment. If it were feasible to do so, 
an experiment could sort individuals who 
apply and are eligible for services 
randomly into two groups those who are 
allowed to receive services and those who 
are not. Then we could compare 
outcomes for all individuals, and as long 
as assignment into treatment or control is 
random, we can have high levels of 
statistical confidence that the program 
was responsible for any differences in the 
outcomes.2
Statewide experimentation with the 
workforce development programs of 
interest is not feasible, so a second best 
method needed to be followed. In this 
case, the net impact analyses were 
conducted via a non-experimental 
methodology. Individuals who 
encountered the workforce development
programs were compared to individuals 
who did not, but members of the latter 
group were not randomly chosen. In 
other words, there were systematic 
(nonrandom) differences between the 
participants and the individuals to whom 
they were compared. An empirical 
approach, called statistical matching, was 
used to find a comparison group for the 
program participants.
Workforce Training and Education 
Coordinating Board staff invested a lot of 
time and resources to construct several 
databases containing administrative data 
about individuals served by the nine 
programs of interest. This effort required 
several interagency agreements among 
state departments responsible for 
administering the programs. In
Statewide experimentation... is
not feasible, so a second best
method needed to be followed.
addition, the WTECB constructed a 
database containing administrative 
information about individuals who 
received labor exchange services through 
the state's employment service. From an 
evaluation perspective, these databases 
had two incredibly desirable features: 
they were universal, and they had 
longitudinal information on employment- 
related information and on income- 
conditioned transfers.
In the analytical framework that we set 
up, we used applicants to the state's 
employment service as the source of 
individuals to whom we would compare 
the participants in the education or 
training programs.3 We used two types 
of selection criteria. First, we eliminated 
individuals who had ever participated in 
any of the programs (except for high 
school career and technical education). 
This screening allowed us to consider all 
of the education and training programs as 
a system. Effectively, we set up a 
framework where program participants 
were in the system, and their next best 
alternative would have been to use the 
employment service. Second, from the 
remaining individuals in the employment
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service database, we used statistical 
matching on an individual-by-individual 
basis to find the people who most closely 
matched program participants in terms of 
observable characteristics. Net impacts 
were then determined by comparing 
outcomes for individuals who participated 
in the education and training programs to 
their matched counterparts from the 
employment service data, who never 
participated in any of the programs.
Data
The longitudinal databases that the 
WTECB constructed and shared with the 
Upjohn Institute staff, who did the 
statistical matching and net impact 
analyses, had three types of data. First, 
there was pre-program information on the
Seven of the nine short-run
employment impacts
are positive.
individuals: demographic information 
like age and education, employment and 
earnings information from the 
Unemployment Insurance wage record 
system, and transfer income information 
such as Food Stamps and Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
recipiency and benefits. The pre-program 
period ran from approximately 1990 to 
when the individuals entered the 
education or training program, or first 
registered for services at the employment 
service. The pre-program data were used 
in the statistical matching to align 
individuals.
The second type of data was 
information about services received while 
in the education or training program. 
These included information such as 
whether the individual completed the 
program, received a credential/degree, 
credits earned, and so forth. These 
variables allowed us to analyze 
differential net impacts for subgroups of 
program participants such as completers 
versus noncompleters.
The third type of data was post- 
program information, or outcomes. These 
included employment-related information
(hours, wage rates, and earnings) and 
transfer program participation and 
benefits. These data were used to actually 
estimate the net impacts of program 
participation. We used a variety of 
estimation techniques to calculate net 
impacts, including comparison of means, 
regression-adjusted comparison of means, 
and difference-in-difference comparison 
of means. We estimated short-run net 
impacts that examined outcomes for 
individuals who exited from the education 
or training programs (or from the 
employment service) in the fiscal year 
1999/2000 and longer-run impacts for 
individuals who exited in the fiscal year 
1997/1998.
Results
Table 1 provides the short-run net 
impacts of the nine programs on 
employment and earnings. The elements 
reported in the table show the increase (or 
decrease) in employment, defined as 
having at least $100 in earnings in the 
third quarter after exiting from the 
program, and the increase (or decrease) in 
quarterly earnings, on average, for that 
quarter. Note that these results include all 
participants those individuals who 
completed their training and those who 
left without completing. Separate results 
for these two groups were estimated.
The employment impacts are in 
percentage-point terms and are all
significant. Two of the programs have 
negative short-run employment impacts, 
whereas all of the others are positive. 
The employment rate of the comparison 
group is on the order of 60 percent to 
70 percent, so these impacts range from 
about 3 to 12 percent. The short-run 
earnings impacts are not as sanguine. 
With the exception of community 
college job preparation, apprenticeship, 
and high school career technical 
education, the short-run earnings 
impacts are negative or not statistically 
significantly different from 0.
Table 2 illustrates the payoff to 
education and training in the longer-run. 
All of the employment impacts are 
positive, and for the three JTPA programs 
and adult basic education at community 
colleges, the longer-run employment 
impacts are much larger than the short- 
run impacts. The earnings picture is also 
far better in the longer-run. Two of the 
programs, JTPA II-C for disadvantaged 
youth and adult basic education, have 
earning impacts that are essentially 0, but 
all other programs show sizeable earnings 
impacts that, in percentage terms, are on 
the order of 20 percent.
In addition to the net impacts, Institute 
staff members are calculating the costs 
and benefits of these training programs. 
Preliminary results show positive returns 
to both participants and to the public, as 
did results that Washington published in
Table 1 Short-Run3 Net Impacts of Washington's Education and 
Training System, by Program
Net employment impact Net quarterly earnings
Program
JTPAII-A
JTPA II-C
JTPA III
Comm. college adult basic ed.
Comm. college job prep.
Comm. college worker retraining
Private career schools
Apprenticeships
High school career technical ed.
aDefined as three quarters after exit. 
**Not statistically significant at the 0.
(in percentage points)
3.6
-4.0
2.2
-5.2
7.6
8.0
2.6
5.4
5.5
10 level.
impacts (2001 $)
105**
86**
-$397
-$613
1,470
147**
10**
2,030
112
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Table 2 Longer-Run3 Net Impacts of Washington's Education and 
Training System, by Program
Net employment impact 
Program (in percentage points)
JTPAII-A
JTPA II-C
JTPA III
Comm. college adult basic ed.
Comm. college job prep.
Comm. college worker retraining
Apprenticeships
High school career technical ed.
7.4
5.3
7.3
1.6
7.0
6.2
5.3
5.7
Net quarterly 
earnings impacts 
(2001 $)
543
-72**
466
-43**
1,185
423
1,908
451
aDefined as average over quarters 8-11 after exit. 
**Not statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
its last analyses in 1997, but the current 
results are not yet available for release.
Notes
1. Federal job training programs under JTPA 
were integrated with public employment services 
through the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) in 
2000. The time frame of the analyses described pre 
ceded this integration, so the participants were still 
receiving services under JTPA.
2. Even with an experiment, there may be imple 
mentation problems or behavioral responses that 
threaten its external validity, i.e., its ability to solve 
the attribution problem. For example, problems 
such as crossover, differential attrition, or Haw 
thorne effects may arise.
3. For high school career technical education 
(CTE), we relied on a different source of data for the 
comparison group members. The state collects data 
through a general survey of all seniors in high 
school, and that survey was used to identify students 
completing career technical education, and as a 
source for comparable students who had not com 
pleted CTE.
Kevin M. Hollenbeck is a senior economist 
at the Upjohn Institute.
Dissertation Award 
Recipients Chosen
J_ he recipients of the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute's Dissertation Award 
competition for 2002 have been chosen. 
The winner is Olivier Deschenes, whose 
dissertation was titled "An Econometric 
Analysis of the Returns to Education in 
the United States." Deschenes's 
dissertation provides a resolution to a 
puzzle that has vexed labor economists 
who study the relationship between 
educational attainment and earnings. 
Does a college education really pay off 
more today than yesterday, or are 
increased returns simply a statistical 
artifact created by relatively more 
motivated, higher-ability people choosing 
to attend college these days? To address 
this issue, Deschenes applies a clever 
estimation technique that uses both 
economy-wide year-specific effects (i.e., 
structural factors such as greater demand 
for highly skilled workers) and cohort- 
specific effects (sorting factors). He finds 
that almost all of the increase in returns to 
education during the 1980s and 1990s was 
due to structural factors, and that changes 
due to the sorting of people by ability and 
education played only a minimal role. 
Deschenes earned a Ph.D. from Princeton 
University; his advisor was Orley 
Ashenfelter. He is now at the University 
of California, Santa Barbara.
An honorable mention was awarded to 
Yu-Che Chang, whose dissertation was 
titled "Evaluating the Structural Effects of 
Property Tax Abatements on Economic 
Development across Industries." This 
award is given in recognition of Dr. 
Ghang's contribution to providing a better 
understanding of the adoption and 
economic impact of property tax 
abatements. His research demonstrates 
that property tax abatements exert little 
influence on employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector, which is the 
primary target for most tax abatement 
efforts. Rather, it finds a significant 
impact on service-sector employment. 
He explains the difference in results by 
recognizing that property tax abatements 
are a subsidy on capital, and thus 
manufacturing firms are likely to 
substitute lower-cost capital for relatively 
higher cost labor, mitigating the 
employment impact. Chang earned his 
Ph.D. from Indiana University; his 
advisor was Joyce Man. He is now at 
National Taipei University.
Another honorable mention was 
awarded to Elizabeth A. Hoffman for her 
dissertation, "Compromise, 
Confrontation, and Coercion: Formal and 
Informal Dispute Resolution in 
Cooperative and Hierarchical Worksites." 
This award is given in recognition of the 
dissertation's original and substantial 
contributions to our understanding of 
dispute resolution in different types of 
industries and under different modes of 
firm organization. The careful, 
innovative research design included a 
survey of 177 workers at eight firms, 
consisting of matched pairs of 
conventional outside-owned firms and 
cooperatives in four industries. An 
interesting finding is that grievance 
resolution practices differ depending 
upon many factors, and while workers in 
cooperatives tend to behave differently 
from conventional firm employees  
using relatively more voice than exit, for 
instance the practices vary significantly 
across industries and even with respect to 
individual characteristics, particularly 
gender. Hoffman earned her Ph.D. from 
the University of Wisconsin, Madison; 
her advisor was Mark C. Suchman. 
Hoffman is now at Purdue University.
Randall W. Eberts, Christopher J. O'Leary, 
Stephen A. Wandner, Eds.
The Workforce 
Investment Act of 
1998 (WIA) 
imposes new 
demands on the 
frontline staff at 
employment 
centers. It 
increases the 
volume of 
customers at local employment centers, 
requires frontline staff to perform new 
tasks, and places greater emphasis on 
operational efficiency and program 
effectiveness.
The process by which frontline staff 
make service referral decisions is called 
"targeting." Targeting typically occurs 
informally, with frontline workers 
making service referral decisions based 
on budgetary and administrative 
conditions, and the assessment tools that 
may be available to them. Formal, 
statistics-based methods are also being 
implemented in a number of 
industrialized nations including the 
Untied States, Australia, and Canada.
Because the targeting process is 
integral to the allocation of scarce 
resources that ensures the greatest social 
return, the U.S. Department of Labor 
teamed with the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
to co-sponsor a conference on what is 
known about targeting. The 
proceedings of that conference are 
available in this new book. The 
contributors review the U.S. experience 
with targeting reemployment services 
and self-employment assistance to UI 
beneficiaries, examine Canadian efforts 
toward targeting reemployment 
services, and consider prospects for a 
new Frontline Decision Support System 
for one-stop centers.
425 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-244-1 / $23 
paper ISBN 0-88099-243-3. September 2002.
New Books
Losing Work, 
Moving On
Peter J. Kuhn, Ed.
This new 
volume presents a 
collaborative effort 
by 22 labor 
economists who 
examine worker 
displacement and 
the attempts to 
address it in 10 
industrialized 
countries. Using large nationally 
representative data sets and detailed 
policy analysis, the authors focus on two 
key questions related to worker 
displacement: 1) whether the 
experiences of displaced workers in the 
Untied States, and the patterns of 
experiences across workers, echo 
patterns seen in other developed 
countries, and 2) what can be learned, 
both from the similarities and from the 
differences across countries?
Within-country patterns are 
described using a number of 
demographic characteristics including 
age, tenure, gender, and skill level. 
Results are also offered from cross- 
national comparisons in the levels of 
key variables (such as the frequency of 
displacement, and the duration of post- 
displacement unemployment) and the 
association of these variables with 
international differences in labor market 
structure. While these sorts of results are 
generally the most difficult to generate, 
they are potentially the most rewarding. 
And in the case of these efforts, they are 
thought-provoking as well.
560 pp. $45 cloth ISBN 0-88099-234-4 / $28 
paper ISBN 0-88099-233-6 / September 2002.
Start-Up Factories
High-Performance
Management, Job Quality,
and Regional Advantage
Peter B. Doeringer, Christine Evans-Klock, 
David G. Terkla
The authors 
chart the 
experience of 
start-up factories 
in adopting high 
performance 
management 
practices and 
provide insights 
into how U.S. 
manufacturing can improve labor 
productivity and job quality in the 
coming years. Based on an extensive 
study of 48 new branch plants that 
began operating between 1978 and 
1990, this book explains how best 
practice manufacturing companies are 
raising productivity and lowering unit 
costs by introducing innovative high 
performance management practices.
Start-Up Factories answers six key 
questions related to high performance 
management practices in the American 
workplace and provides criteria for 
evaluating certain strategies. In doing 
so, it demonstrates to economists, labor 
management professionals, and 
policymakers that there is a set of 
principles about how to rebuild 
management systems in ways that 
simultaneously provide higher rates of 
growth in business productivity and a 
greater sharing of these productivity 
gains with workers.
This book is co-published with and 
available from Oxford University Press. 
To order call 1-800-451-7556 or visit 
http://www.oup-usa.org.
273 pp. $39.95 ISBN 0-19-514747-2 
September 2002.
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